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Abstract
Social Robots (SR) can record large streams
of raw data in the form of images, audio, Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID), among other
sensory sources, which could be instrumental in
enforcing Human-robot interactions (HRI). However,
the emotional bonds between humans and SR can
raise an SR accessing/inferring profoundly private
information, e.g., emotional states. Therefore, in what
concerns privacy, SR may be a liability. Clarifying
the ownership of data collected by robots is an issue
of concern in the European Union (EU) General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which requires
’privacy-by-design’. The paper presents BlockRobot
– a Blockchain (BC)-based software design model
for developing privacy-by-design application in
Human-Robot Interactions (HRI). Based on this design
model, users can access the private data generated in
their HRI. This paper’s contributions are the design
and validation of a model to develop privacy-by-design
applications for HRI. This model integrates BC
technology with robots to audit robotic events such as
Red, Green, Blue, Depth (RGB-D) images, and RFID
tags. Smart contracts and crypto-wallets accomplish
identity management. To demonstrate the utility of the
initial implementation of a Decentralized Application
(dApp), we implement a prototype, based on the
private permissioned Evolution of Scalability (EOS)
Blockchain integrated with the social robot moving in a
non-laboratory environment.
1. Introduction
Social robots are designed to assist humans socially.
The way a person interacts with a social robot is
quite different from interacting with an autonomous
robot. People prefer to interact with robots with basic
communication and social skills. Social interactions
imply the implementation of a new vast broad of features
that require multidisciplinary research [1]. Scientists
need to understand the philosophical, ethical, and
legal layers that motivate typical human behavior. To
create social robots capable of genuine social behavior,
they need to interact with humans at an emotional
level [2] and act socially expected by humans. The
long-term goal is to assist humans in tasks, such as
education, health, entertainment, communication, and
tasks requiring teamwork. On the one hand, SR can
collect data from (among many other sensors) RGB
and RGB-D images, record audio data, react to human
voices, and detect RFID signals. RGB-D images
(cf. Fig. 1) are depth images in which the value of
each pixel in the image represents the distance to the
object. They provide the ability to accurately sense
and track humans and objects without the possibility
of complete identification [3]. RFID signals give
information regarding the position, and proximity can
be inferred [4–6]. On the other hand, people tend to
bond with SR that look like humans and are likely to
interact with them at an emotional level [7] (in general,
within the bounds of the uncanny valley paradigm [8]).
Due to the variety and unprecedented volume of private
data that SR can collect, they raise questions about
privacy [9] and security [2], subjecting them to GDPR
[10, 11] – a European Regulation that imposes legal
compliance to all the public and private companies.
In Human-robot interactions (HRI), it is not easy
to prove the provenance and continuous compliance
with GDPR if end users cannot access the SR data.
Moreover, due to the incomplete implementation of the
Figure 1: RGB-D Images captured by robot: Left – a
person is clearly visible; Right – no person in sight.





GDPR principles, concerns on the lack of transparency
may be raised. Besides the privacy enforcing
techniques employed by a CA, there is growing
attention to the decentralized private data management
paradigm. Decentralized solutions such as Blockchain
provide high-level properties of decentralization,
transparency, tamper-resistance, and traceability.
For that reason, Blockchain is an excellent candidate
to comply with GDPR for HRI. In this paper, we show
how BC, when integrated with SR, can improve users’
privacy in HRI, resulting in a better experience. Using
a case study, we demonstrate the utility of a BC-based
architecture encompassing an implementation of a dApp
based on a private permissioned EOS Blockchain,
integrated with an SR. Our solution allows end-users
(hospital staff, patients, and visitors) to control private
data generated during their interaction with the SR
transparently and fairly. The experiments are performed
in hospital corridors and rooms. The execution data logs
are computed with process mining techniques [12] to
analyze the performance and bottlenecks existing in the
case study.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents the relevant background. Section 3
describes in detail the proposed architecture and its
information workflows. Section 4 illustrates the working
example. Section 5 provides discussion and limitations,
and Section 6 concludes and points to future work.
2. Background
This section provides a brief introduction to
Blockchain and exemplifies related work regarding its
benefits for privacy and robotics.
2.1. Blockchain-based Technologies for
Privacy
Blockchain is a distributed shared ledger replicated
over the network nodes interacting between themselves
based on a set of rules known as a consensus
system. The primary data structure of a BC is a
block encompassing a set of transactions. Each block
is chained to the previous block by cryptographic
hashes [13], making it virtually impossible to erase BC
data. The participants can write to the BC to modify
its state by creating transactions, but cannot erase it.
There are three variations of BC based on the permission
model: permissionless – any party can to read from
and write to the BC; permissioned – access to the
BC is restricted to authorized parties, and; partially
permissioned – some actions, for example, read
access, is granted to anyone, but other actions, for
example, write access, may be limited to authorized
parties.
BC has been implemented in different areas,
including improving privacy. In the scope of access
control, Zyskind et al. propose a decentralized
privacy solution using a Blockchain to enforce a
self-sovereign access-control management [14]. Truong
et al. propose a BC-based solution to improve
the integrity and transparency of data stored by
centralized entities [15]. Faber et al. proposed a
human-centric and GDPR-compliant personal data and
identity management system based on the Blockchain
technology [16].
2.2. ROS, RFID and Blockchain in Robotics
Many robots operate on ROS (Robot Operating
System) – a middleware to develop robot applications.
The ROS contains robotic events stored temporarily
in the robot’s named structures – ROS topics [17].
The use of ROS when developing robots is a natural
choice. It is common for robots operating on ROS
to be enabled with RFID sensors to detect RFID tags.
RFID technology enables detecting contactless ID tags
in scenarios where identification features with minimal
false positives are required [6]. When integrated
with robots and ROS, these wireless sensors provide
information on RFID tags’ position [6].
In the literature on HRI, some efforts demonstrate
how BC can enhance privacy in HRI. Ferrer et al. [18]
use BC technology to improve privacy when sharing
sensitive data between robots and machine learning
models. Their solution is prominent in increasing
transparency in HRI. A research conducted by
Degarding and Alexandre [19] shows how Blockchain
can assist in auditing robotics events. Fernandes and
Alexandre also proposed Blockchain’s use to audit
robotics events by using Tezos’s technology [20].
Their research intends to explore the BC immutability
properties to solve the problem of tampering the
records of robotic actions in the context of factory
robots. Integrating BC with robots seems to improve
cooperation by providing the robots with a single
immutable source of truth where they can share the
knowledge base [21].
With this research in mind, BC seems like an
excellent candidate in developing privacy-by-design
applications to improve privacy in HRI. Private
permissioned Blockchain is the most reasonable choice
to enhance the privacy of individuals’ data because it
provides restricted access to the network.
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3. Architecture Design
This section describes the design architecture of the
BlockRobot dApp (Fig. 2). The system is composed
of the basic interaction between a robot and a human,
starting in the HRI layer. The robot is equipped with
RGB-D camera – used to record streams of images; and
an RFID sensor that can detect RFID tags from which
the information about proximity can be inferred [6].
We equip individuals with RFID tags embedded into
smart cards, so that robot with RFID laser can detect
individuals without the line of sign or ambiguity (with
anonymization techniques). After the basic interaction
of a human by the robot, both streams of images
and the RFID tags are published as separate ROS
events. Furthermore, the BlockRobot API can access
that data in API layer through the ROS Middleware
– software that allows us to read robotic events in
the publish-subscribe pattern. The BlockRobot API
is a trusted server that handles data transformations of
ROS events into private data, and operates the off-chain
storage by synchronizing the on-chain transactions with
off-chain database updates. Once the BlockRobot API
main algorithms retrieve private data from ROS events,
the data can be persisted in Blockchain and Persistence
layer, which represents the storage of data – through
BC and off-chain repository, and the access of data
– managed by the smart contracts. To modify BC’s
state, individuals and robots interact with BC are the
peers – by issuing the transactions.
3.1. Design Guidelines
In this section, we provide the main design
guidelines to develop privacy-by-design applications for
HRI.
Figure 2: High-level System Architecture of
BlockRobot
Correct data outline: (i) The communication
should be achieved by subscribing to the ROS topics
through ROS middleware, both to prevent additional
overhead on the robot and obtain all the relevant data
for private data classification algorithms, e.g., RFID
tags and RGB-D images. (ii) The individuals’ identities
should be anonymized to ensure data confidentiality and
security.
Data Persistence (i) BC should be used as a trust
anchor. In other words, the data to be stored on-chain
are the hashes of private data. BC is immutable storage,
therefore placing hashes on BC will provide verifiability
of data integrity. (ii) The private data should be persisted
off-chain, e.g., traditional DBMS (e.g., PostgreSQL,
MongoDB), a cloud storage (e.g., AWS or Azure), a
distributed storage system (e.g., IPFS, [22]). Storage
of the private data off-chain allows it to be deleted, as
required by GDPR’ ”Right to be Forgotten” [10, p. 32].
Furthermore, to provide confidentiality of private data,
(iii) the off-chain data should be encrypted, naturally,
with the data owner’s keys. As an example, the possible
algorithms to consider are Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
or RSA [23]. (iv) For faster lookup, the off-chain
and on-chain data should be linked, for instance, as
in the example further demonstrated in section 4 by
Transaction ID (TXID). (v) The off-chain and on-chain
should be synchronized. Once a new block is validated
in the BC, the off-chain database should be triggered
to align the change. Accordingly, if a participant or a
robot update the BC state, then the off-chain state will
update as well. (vi) Robots and participants should act
as peers in Blockchain to provide the provenance and
non-repudiation of private data.
User Interface and BC Transactions (i) Private
data generated in HRI should be easily retrievable and
presented in a human-readable format through the user
interface. (ii) Once presented with the data, users should
be able to access and erase their private data by UI. (iii)
Users should create a new transaction to the BC per
each access or deletion of data. By being an immutable
truth source, all the actions can be audited on the BC,
thus providing accountability. (iv) To prove the user’s
identity securely, each individual should have a crypto
wallet keeping the private and public keys. The crypto
wallet should be integrated with the user interface and
request a digital signature on each transaction. The
digital signature is proof of the individual’s identity that
needs to be provided on each data’s access and erasure.
3.2. Data Subject Classification
During the interactions between a robot and a
human, the robot may record large streams of images.
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To illustrate, we present the interaction design in
Figure 3, where the robot records RGB-D images while
a person walks by the robot. A person is equipped
with a smart card with an embedded RFID tag. As
the interaction goes, and streams of RGB-D images
are published on the RGB-D Topic, the RFID laser
embedded in the robot detects an RFID tag from the
person’s smart card. It is worth to note that the RFID tag
detection and RGB-D image are asynchronous events
because the RFID laser and the kinetic camera are
separate devices. Therefore, the data from both events
require additional coordination.
RFID tags provide information regarding the
proxemics and time relating to the RFID laser. Previous
research [6] points out that RFID tags are subject to
background noises, depending on the environmental
conditions, which may reduce the precision of the time
and distance of an individual carrying tags. Still,
they provide knowledge that some individuals are in
the robot’s vicinity, which is valuable for identification
purposes. The RFID signal is composed of the
UID – unique identifier, and the timestamp when the
RFID signal was detected. Furthermore, the UID gets
anonymized by hashing it, with the intuit to difficult the
individual’s possible re-identification.
In real-world scenarios, many people may walk
by the robot. Therefore, many RFID signals will
be identified simultneously. For that reason, all
the anonymized UIDs and timestamp retrieved from
each RFID tag are temporarily stored in the off-chain
repository. The storage of the UIDs will allow us
to consult the information about all the individuals
detected in HRI, and consequently, who is present in the
RGB-D image recorded at a specific time.
On the other hand, to identify an individual in the
network, we persist his/her anonymized UID on the BC
(Further explained). Besides being immutable, placing
Figure 3: ROS middleware and BlockRobot interactions
– Classification of data owner model
Figure 4: Time Pairing model: Left – Image detected
out of bounds of RFID detection; Right – Image
detected in bounds of RFID detection
RFID tags on BC provides an indirect relation between
known participants and their RFID tags. Finally, the
algorithm has enough data to know (i) who are the
known members of the network – UIDs stored
on-chain, and (ii) who are the individuals detected
in a specific time interval – UIDs and timestamps
temporarily stored off-chain. Then two lists of UIDs
are reduced into a list of known members detected in
a given interval. For each RGB-D image, this list will
be used to understand whether an individual in a list is
present in the RGB-D image. If yes, then we can create
a unique data structure containing the RGB-D image
and individuals identified in the image. The details are
discussed in the Time-Pairing Algorithm.
3.3. Time-Pairing Algorithm
The Time-pairing algorithm consists of examining
each RGB-D image and the list of RFID tags, and
give as output whether that RGB-D image is a private
data or not. If it is a private data, meaning there are
individuals identified in the image, it also says who the
individuals are. Each RFID detected is a single event in
the time-pairing algorithm. Therefore if there are many
participants near the robot, many RFID events will be
published. One RGB-D image is also an event. Different
inputs, such as a list of RFIDs, one RFID, or zero
RFIDs collected from events during the HRI, will trigger
different outcome scenarios. Furthermore, for different
RFIDs detected, based on the timestamps of detection,
we estimate how long the participant identified shall be
considered to remain close to the robot. ∆ denominates
this estimate.
We define ∆ as a certain interval for which the
person carrying a tag should be considered in the robot
vicinity. For simplicity, here and after, we will refer to
the RFID tag detection as the same as the individual
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Figure 5: Identity Management Model – Registration
and Authentication
being detected. For each individual detected by the
robot, we take this event’s timestamp and enclose it
with ∆, which will give us the interval of time when the
person remains near the robot. Two possible outcomes
may happen (illustrated in Figure 4): (i) The out of
bound time-pairing (Fig. 4 - Left) – In this outcome,
the estimated interval of the person’s presence near the
robot does not intersect with the time when the image
is recorded. In this case, the algorithm detects no
participant in the RGB-D image, and therefore this is not
a private data. (ii) The inbound time-pairing (Fig. 4 -
Right) – Outcome when the estimated time when the
robot sees the participant intersects with the timestamp
of the RGB-D image recording. As a result, the
algorithm outputs that image as a private data belonging
to the person identified in the image.
If more that one person is identified during HRI,
meaning that some RFID intervals overlap, then more
than one participant is in the image. In such a case,
the picture is the private data belonging to all these
persons, and anonymization algorithms can be applied
so that individuals cannot recognize other people in
the image. Further, a person can request the deletion
of the link between him and the image. Given the
sufficient anonymity level, if the individual is no longer
recognizable on the image, that image is no longer
considered that participant’s private data. Once the
last participant requests deletion, then the image can be
deleted.
3.4. Identity Management with Smart
Contracts and UID
Identity management comprises two phases – proof
of ownership of the UID (retrieved from RFID tag) and
proof of identity by a digital signature. Once proven the
identity, a user may access all the images with his/her
associated UID. We illustrate the Registration and the
Authentication on Fig. 5.
Registration: to interact with a private permissioned
BC user must belong to the network. In our architecture,
the proof of membership to the BC is managed by the
smart contracts. As a first step, a user should provide his
UID and a public key through a user interface and issue
a new transaction to the BC with his UID (hashed) and
public key as a payload. Further, once the transaction is
initiated, the smart contract will require the user to sign
the transaction with his/her private key. Once signed, the
smart contract performs a public key recovery to prove
that the digital signature belongs to the user’s public
key. Given the cryptographic relation between private
and public keys, and a digital signature inferred from
the private key, it is possible to recover a public key from
the digitally signed transaction. Once the public key is
confirmed to belong to the user, and the transaction is
valid, the UID with the user’s public key will be installed
on the Blockchain, and the user can begin the process of
authentication for future access the data under that same
UID.
Authentication: To access private data, the user
needs to authenticate to the network by providing his
previously registered UID. Once provided, the UID is
hashed, and the smart contract search for the UID on the
BC. If any hash of UID installed on BC matches the UID
that an individual claims to own, then the smart contract
performs a public key recovery algorithm (explained
above) to recover a public key from the digitally signed
transaction. Once the public key matches the public key
installed on the BC under the provided UID, the user is
the UID owner. Therefore, the proof of UID ownership
is successful, and the user can access his private data.
4. Implementation and case study
As a proof of concept, we established an initial
implementation of a BC-based dApp based on the design
guidelines presented in section 3, integrated with a
social robot (Fig. 6) moving in hospital corridors and
rooms. Previous experience pointed out that the robotic
events happen on the high frequency with potentially
thousands of images per minute. EOS Blockchain
seemed to be an ideal solution to guarantee the quality
of the data and avoid performance bottlenecks due to
its Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus that
supports high transaction speed [24]. As far as we know,
we are the first to integrate EOS Blockchain to audit
robotic events.
The following experiences intend to test the
architecture and to answer the question: ”Is it possible
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for individuals to access their private data generated
during their interactions with the robot without any
security breach for other participants?” In other words,
we want to know whether users can control only their
data, and personal data is correctly outlined. For the
sake of our research, participants should wear wireless
RFID tags embedded in smart cards to be correctly
recognized by a social robot with an RFID reader. As
an experimental protocol, we consider the following
three stages. Pre-experiment: (i) configuration of
the two users smart cards identified by RFID tags,
(ii) preparation of one social robot with its dedicated
camera for image recording and RFID sensor used for
detecting and positioning of RFID tags, (iii) reset of
the Blockchain and database, and create 1 (or 2) wallet
key pair(s) (one for each user), (iv) register each user in
the network with his/her RFID and key pair, (v) deploy
the BlockRobot API and a Mongo database (off-chain
repository). Experiment execution: (i) the individuals
and the robot act as peers and are connected to the local
network, (ii) users walk near the robot, and the robot
detects a person in less than 5 seconds (in the range of 3
meters). Post-experiment: (i) extraction of data logs and
process mining techniques are performed to evaluate the
system’s performance.
4.1. Experiments
We performed many different experiments and
summarised them in the four main scenarios. (i) One
person walking by the robot carrying the RFID card.
The robot is recording streams of RGB-D images and
detects an RFID tag. At the end of the scenario, the
person can access his/her data and visualize the images
recorded by the robot. (ii) The same scenario as before,
with one person and one robot recording RGB-D images
and detecting the person with its RFID laser. However,
in this scenario, the data is corrupted. An example of
Figure 6: MOnarCH Robot – the social robot used in
the experiments
Figure 7: Graph showing the execution of system events
during experiment 1.
corrupted data may result from a malicious party gaining
access to the off-chain repository and modifying the
recorded data. This configuration shows the Integrity
property of the personal data assured by the proposed
framework because of the use of Blockchain as a trust
anchor. If some data is corrupted, then the integrity test
will fail. Still, the user can access his/her personal data
and have the information that the data was corrupted.
The sensors’ corruption that could occur in the external
environment is out of this project’s scope. (iii) A third
scenario manifest slightly different configuration. Here,
two users walk by the robot, one at the time, without
intersecting their images. This experiment demonstrates
the feasibility of the BlockRobot algorithms to outline
the private data to the participants correctly. As a
result of the experiment, two individuals could access
their private data without causing any security breach to
the other participant. (iv) In the last experiment, two
individuals walk by the robot at the same time. In the
real-world scenario, this is possibly the most common
situation because it is common to have many people
walking in the hospital corridors simultaneously. In
this scenario, both individuals were identified by the
robot, and their RFID intervals intersected, meaning that
two participants are identified in the same image. Both
can access the images because it is their private data.
However, the other’s individuals shapes are blurred as an
attempt to anonymize them in the image. In such a case,
the participants’ confidentiality is guaranteed because
it is not possible to detect them; hence their identities
are covered by applying the anonymization techniques,
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Figure 8: Graph showing the execution of system events during experiment 2.
e.g., blurring faces. Therefore the user can access data
or revoke access (delete data) without breaching of data
privacy of other users as no information is given about
other data subjects’ identities in the recording.
4.2. Results
We analyzed the performance of the system using
process mining techniques [12]. from the data resulting
from two experiments: (i) one person and one robot
(Fig. 7) and (ii) two persons interacting with one robot
simultaneously (Fig. 8). Further data is presented in
statistical tables in GitHub links: statistical data with
one person 1 and with two persons 2
Each operation corresponds to the following
system’s event. IMAGE RETRIEVE – the
generation of a new image recorded by the
robot; RFID RETRIEVE – the generation
of a new RFID tag recorded by the robot;
IMAGE NOT PAIRED NOT EXIST RFID – image
not associated because no RFID
time intersects with image time;







– image not associated with the
RFID because it is unknown RFID
(non-registered); IMAGE PAIRED – an image
associated with RFID by time intersection;
BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTION – Blockchain
transaction validated and the hash of image is stored
in Blockchain; DATABASE PERSISTANCE – the
encrypted image is stored on BC.
By analyzing the logs in both experiments,
the most time-consuming event occurs
when IMAGE PAIRED execute successfully,
and BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTION is
triggered – showing that Blockchain transaction
plays a cost-effective part of the system. Moreover, all
the IMAGE PAIRED instances have a correspondingly
BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTION instance; therefore,
no transaction has been considered corrupted. In
the first experiment, the difference from the activity
frequency of IMAGE RETRIEVE to the frequency
of DATABASE PERSISTANCE shows that only 7%
of the images are being paired and stored encrypted.
With the increase of RFIDs, in the second experiment,
this value increases to 13%. In the second experiment
(Figure 8), a more complex network of events shows
that in some instances are identified some other RFIDS
that were not involved directly in this experiment
(e.g., other health care personnel). In those situations,
only the identified RFIDs are considered, and a
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BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTION triggered.
All the code relative to the current implementation
is open-source and available on Github 3 altogether
with the datasets from discussed experiences 4, and the
detailed diagrams 5.
5. Discussion and Limitations
This section discusses the proposed solution,
including the privacy validation in HRI, the GDPR
compliance, and the Blockchain benefits evaluation and
possible security and privacy threats.
5.1. Privacy Validation in HRI
According to Art. 4 of the GDPR, ”personal
data means any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (data subject); an
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors [...].”, even when data are encrypted or hashed,
it qualifies as personal data under EU law [11].
We analyzed the GDPR legal documents [10,11] and
identified the main privacy conditions. We illustrate
in Figure 9 the mapping between the GDPR privacy
requirements and the BlockRobot design choices. From
the related work, it seems clear that currently, SRs
support basic privacy requirements such as principle
of purpose limitation, data minimization. The data
that the robot collect has the sole purpose of providing
suitable interactions. Moreover, the robot knows
the minimum amount of information, inferred from
its embedded sensors, for the HRI. Another GDPR
privacy rule is the Storage Limitation – enforced by
destroying the data that is no longer necessary [25].
In Social Robotics, from both legal and ethical
perspectives, we foresee that users should have
information transparency and fairness. Fairness
is defined by M. Fink in GDPR [10, p. 64] as
clarity regarding the purpose of data, meaning that
individuals understand the purpose of data collection.
Regarding transparency in privacy, the accountability
and provenance of data is required. Individuals should
be notified of all data processing activities in the past and
the future. The provenance means the non-repudiation
of the data – the source of the data should be clear






means that individuals should be assured in some way
that the data they have access to is the data resulting
from their interaction with that robot.
Results of the experiments in the previous
section validate that individuals are given privacy
by opacity – no individual can access the data that does
not belong to him. Moreover, the off-chain private data
is encrypted, thus providing the confidentiality of the
data. Besides, off-chain storage enables individuals
with the possibility to erase the data or revoke access.
Furthermore, by using BC as a trust anchor, it is
possible to audit the history of data processing activities
in retrospective and grant the participants with data
accountability, and the possibility to verify the data
integrity by hashing data. Finally, if robots interact
in the BC as peers and issue transactions, the data’s
provenance is guaranteed by design.
5.2. Security and Privacy Threats
Identity management based on RFID and BC is
an innovative approach. In BlockRobot, identity
management is based on placing the RFID tags on the
BC, which any network member can visualize. One
of the privacy-sensitive topics to discuss is the degree
to which the placing of RFID tags on the Blockchain
is secure. If the owner of the RFID tag happens to
be discovered, then everybody in the network knows
who the individual that has been ”seen” by the robot is.
However, it is worth noting that they will not access the
individuals’ images even in his/her identity disclosure.
For that reason, it is crucial to anonymize the RFID
tags before placing them in BC. In the definition of
the GDPR [10], the anonymity is the degree to which
it is impossible to re-identify a data subject from the
data. We attempt to anonymize that data by hashing the
UIDs extracted from the tags; however, a sufficiently
motivated malicious entity may re-identify the hash’s
Figure 9: Privacy Validation – GDPR Requirements and
BlockRobot Design Guidelines mapping
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actual UID. The platform might be prone to pattern
analysis despite the use of hashed UIDs. Whether the
storage of hashed RFID tags on Blockchain provides the
irreversibility in identification is the specific question to
each system/business involved, in our case, HRI.
In theory, the same problem may apply to the storage
of the hashes of depth images on BC. However, in the
case of depth images, it seems highly unlikely that some
intruder may reconstruct the depth image by knowing
only the hash. Therefore, we assume that the hashes of
depth images on BC are a secure option.
Another relevant topic for discussion is the security
of using the BlockRobot API as a trusted intermediary.
BlockRobot API access to the robotic events transferred
through the network is subject to a Man-in-the-middle
attack. Such danger can be mitigated by delegating the
BlockRobot API’s computations to the robot wherein
the smart contracts execute all the data transformations
when social robots issue transactions. Hence, due
to the simplification of the experimental environment,
BlockRobot API is used as an intermediary to
demonstrate the concept’s feasibility.
5.3. GDPR and the Right to be Forgotten
GDPR, in its literature [11], explicitly states the
obligation of any entity with access to individuals data
to provide them with the ”Right to be Forgotten” – the
ability to erase the data. In this sense, as one of
the leading design guidelines, we state that the private
data should not be stored on the Blockchain due to
its immutability, which invalidates the data’s erasure.
As a solution, the privacy-by-design applications for
HRI should have off-chain storage where the data
can be erased [26]. Still, an open question remains
whether the corresponding hash of private data, which
remains on the BC forever, is considered private data,
subject to particular environments and implementations,
and related to the hashes’ degree of anonymity
(the sufficiently anonymous data is no longer private
data [10]). In the experience performed in section 4,
it seems highly unlikely that some malicious entity may
re-identify the owner of an arbitrary RGB-D image by
knowing only the hash stored on BC. Therefore, hashes
of binary files, such as RGB-D images, when stored on
BC, at first glance, may seem unlinkable to any outer
information.
Additionally, a loose term of erasure leaves
discussion and flexibility as to when some data shall
be considered deleted. A possible solution could be
to destroy the private keys in the BC environment that
enable access to that data. Hence, by being inaccessible
or unreadable, in some interpretations, that private data
may be considered erased.
5.4. EOS Blockchain Evaluation
Robotic events happen at a very high frequency
with potentially thousands of events per minute. The
experience with BC applications pointed out to use
EOS Blockchain [24] because of its promising results
regarding the transaction throughput and potential of
scalability. Further, the results of our performance
evaluation indicate that there is a place to improve
performance.
Moreover, the current state of the art shows other
implementations that attempt to integrate robotic events
with the BC.Iin the literature, the use of Tezos [18,
20] or Aitheon [27] BC was found. Besides, a
new research area is emerging – the Blockchain
interoperability [28] – the ability to connect two or more
BC cooperating. Given the benefits of BC, we foresee
the integration of many Blockchains with robots in the
future. Therefore, the BlockRobot could enhance the
privacy in HRI and cooperate with some other BC that
offers some other solutions.
6. Conclusions and Future work
SR bears potential in personal assistant robots,
healthcare, manufacturing industry, education
assistants, defense agents, public space hosting,
and many more. In particular, people tend to engage
with robots that look more like humans on an emotional
level. Individuals have limited knowledge about the
robots’ inference abilities and what information they
may happen to know during their HRI. We need to
provide them with adequate privacy-by-design features
to comply with GDPR requirements, both legally and
ethically. BlockRobot aims at being a step in the
right direction while stimulating the discussion on
privacy-by-design in SR.
As future work, performing demonstrations with
real stakeholders to evaluate the perceived fairness
and transparency by individuals during HRI is a
natural step. Moreover, the images are being
presented in the RAW format, and using a stream
processing could increase the user experience and
the quality of visualization of the pictures. Another
task would deem to remove the trusted API for data
transformations and delegate the responsibility to the
robots, wherein the business logic is written by smart
contracts and robots perform transactions on their
own. Additionally, performing the evaluations regarding
the hashes’ anonymity stored on-chain, as these have
special attention under GDPR scope [10, p. 31]. The
anonymity improvements can be analyzed if using salted
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of peppered hash [10, p. 31], wherein the risks can
be measured by pattern analyzes or collision resistance
attack. Moreover, other sensors may be more invasive
to users’ privacy, e.g., audio and emotional state. Future
studies on the inclusion of these privacy-sensitive data
shall be considered. We believe that the matter of
privacy in HRI is a complex issue and needs much work
to be done and that our research will serve as a ground
point to further investigation.
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